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Tactical destabilization for economic justice: The first phase of
the 1984-2004 rhythm & blues royalty reform movement.
Matt Stahl, University of Western Ontario
‘[E]ven if I should speak, no one would believe me. And they would not believe me
precisely because they would know that what I said was true.’
James Baldwin1
‘We have paid a price to sing this music.’
Ruth Brown2

1. Introduction
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, something unusual happened in the US
recording industry: a group of major record companies—including Warner, MCA, and
Capitol/EMI—wiped out the production debts of dozens of retirement-age black R&B
and soul singers, enabling those artists to collect royalties on recordings that were still
selling, decades after their initial release. In many cases, these companies doubled or
tripled the royalty rates specified in the artists’ original 1950s contracts. Some artists
were able to claim as much as 20 years’ worth of unpaid royalties, gaining payouts of
thousands of dollars. Many of these performers had never received a royalty payment
until then.
The actions of these conglomerates were not the result of an attorney general’s
investigation, nor were they spontaneous acts of magnanimity. They were propelled by a
‘royalty reform’ movement made up of sexagenarian performers, pro-bono lawyers,
sympathetic lawmakers, stars of popular music, and other supporters. Together, these
actors destabilized a longstanding subsystem of exploitation characteristic of what Mahon
calls the ‘racialized political economy’ of the recording industry, wherein black
performers ‘occupy a subordinate position’ even as their creative work serves as a
‘central creative resource’ in the industry as well as in mainstream (often whitedominated) musical cultures of the United States.3 This episode culminated in companies
and executives acknowledging the existence of this subsystem, reforming their royalty
accounting for many affected artists, and committing funds to the creation and support of
a non-profit Rhythm & Blues Foundation to provide financial assistance to, and foster the
public recognition of, the many aging R&B performers on whose behalf the movement
had fought. Strikingly, these events transpired in the context of the record industry’s
consolidation into a handful of ever more powerful multinational corporations.
Contests involving the rights of recording artists with respect to recording and
music industry organizations are an important theme in scholarly, journalistic, and
1
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popular analyses of US popular music.4 Yet aside from the odd passing mention,5 no
scholarly attention has been paid to this movement. Drawing on trade journal and major
newspaper coverage, archival and autobiographical sources, and popular and scholarly
histories, this essay outlines this contractual regime and explains how royalty reformers
destabilized it to the advantage of the performers. As the first product of a broader
research project, the paper proposes an account of R&B royalty accounting practices and
their reform that will begin to fill in gaps in the history of talent contracting and the
control of creative labor and property in the recording industry.6
This essay contextualizes and recounts the royalty reform movement’s first phase.
It focuses primarily on the contest led by R&B singer Ruth Brown and attorney Howell
Begle against Atlantic Records, then sketches in less detail the ensuing Atlantic-funded
establishment of the Rhythm & Blues Foundation and the subsequent participation of
other major record companies in royalty reform.7 This first phase of royalty reform
differs from the run of artist-company contests, most of which resolve along more or less
predictable lines reflecting established power relations in the field: artist complaints
about contractual and/or accounting problems are typically quieted by renegotiation, and
rarely culminate in public or courtroom resolution.8 While the initial efforts of Brown and
4
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Begle did benefit from their ability to threaten Atlantic legally, they did not turn to that
familiar tool of music industry negotiation, the lawsuit. Instead, through Brown’s 1980s
‘comeback’ and ensuing capture of media attention—including lauded film and stage
roles in addition to news media coverage—and Begle’s behind-the-scenes research, the
two claimants produced a ‘counterstory’9 that helped to destabilize and delegitimize both
the contracting and accounting regime that directed earnings away from R&B artists and
the dominant narratives that justified it. Remarkably, the royalty reformers’ development
and circulation of a sympathetic narrative of unjust exploitation, coupled with the
building of formidable evidence against Atlantic, pushed other major companies to
undertake reforms without being themselves subjected to direct or even indirect legal
threats.
Section 2 of this essay introduces complementary positions on ‘narrative’ as a
form and component of arguments such as those examined here, proposing an analytical
framework for an analysis of royalty reform that draws on legal and social science
scholarship. Section 3 offers a brief account of the royalty contracting system that
formalized and organized the relations between most of the independent (or ‘indie’)10
R&B record companies of the 1940s, 50s, and 60s and their black recording artists, and
argues that this regime should be understood as private, exploitative, and racialized. In
four subsections, Section 4 recounts the activities of Ruth Brown and Howell Begle (and
their allies) and some of the principal outcomes of those activities. Section 5 offers a
concluding summary of the account and poses questions that will guide planned future
research.
2. Narrative
This essay’s account is structured narratively, as an antagonism between two
groups of actors, in which the first (the black R&B performers) have been deprived of
their rightful earnings by the second (the R&B record companies and their latter-day
corporate owners). While archival documents and journalistic accounts do feature
prominently in this analysis, the following account is to a large extent built on verbal
reports by this first group, in the manner of the narrative approach developed by
exponents of critical race theory or CRT.11 CRT has emerged out of the research of
‘activists and scholars interested in studying and transforming the relationship among
race, racism, and power’.12 Central to this project are arguments that social structure in
the United States has been and remains white supremacist, and that US law, developed in
9
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this context, often unjustly denies voice and standing to members of subordinated groups.
In response, CRT scholars have argued for the usefulness and validity of narrative as a
‘language for minorities to communicate harms’ that are not recognized by law, because
minorities ‘did not formulate our legal practices or modes of argument’13—including, for
example, the legal time limits that prevented civil claims on previous decades’ royalties.
Minority narrative of the kind developed by CRT scholars, offered in accounts and
contexts of legal contest, ‘is a tool to change [the] mind set’14 of legal decision-makers,
who typically belong to the dominant racial group and take the fairness and legitimacy of
existing law more or less for granted. Martinez argues that CRT’s arguments about the
affordances of narrative ‘is especially true for counter narratives which provide
alternative perspectives through narrative—i.e., perspectives that run counter to the
dominant perspective’.15 Royalty reform’s counter narratives of routine artist
mistreatment at the hands of Atlantic Records (and other companies) began gaining wider
circulation at the same time that Ahmet Ertegun, Atlantic’s founder and president, was
himself articulating a celebratory public display of the dominant perspective on his own
and his company’s contributions to US culture—a 40th anniversary concert at New
York’s Madison Square Garden. Brown’s counter narrative, bolstered by Begle’s
research, aimed to ‘unmask the gentility’16 of Ertegun and Atlantic Records at the very
moment that the executive and the company were working to affirm the dominant
perspective and consecrate themselves publicly.
The counter-narrative tactic identified and fostered by CRT resonates with the
analysis of ‘offstage’ discourse that contrasts the ‘public’ and ‘hidden’ ‘transcripts’ of
dominant and subordinate actors in relations of power. Scott writes that ‘virtually all
ordinarily observed relations between dominant and subordinate [actors] represent the
encounter of the public transcript of the dominant with the public transcript of the
subordinate’.17 This knowledge ‘hardly exhausts what we might wish to know about
power’18 because it can only really encompass the (often legitimating) masks worn by the
powerful in the public exercise of power and the (often deferential) masks worn by the
weak when in view and/or hearing of the powerful. What matter to Scott are the hidden
transcripts shared within dominant groups (behind closed doors), and among
subordinated groups (in distinct social sites carved out by them), that illuminate systems
and subjective experiences of domination. The present essay considers the possibility that
13
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the passage of decades following the termination of the employment relations between
the independent record companies and the R&B performers—and the advances of the
Civil Rights and Black Power movements during that time—created the conditions in
which performers could begin to give voice to previously hidden transcripts. Nearing
retirement age, and having all but given up on their royalty rights, Ruth Brown and her
colleagues had little to lose (and much to gain), and while their counterstories
contradicted the official stories of Atlantic Records and other companies, a growing
general perception of the 1950s as a period of routine racial exploitation underwrote their
credibility. Moreover, the sudden appearance of elements of Atlantic Records’ own
hidden transcript—internal memoranda indicating royalty fraud—helped create the
conditions in which the dominant perspective—the public transcript—could be
challenged and undermined.
Scott’s further insights about the relationship of appropriation and indignity are
particularly salient. The ‘process of appropriation’, he writes, ‘unavoidably entails
systematic social relations of subordination that impose indignities of one kind or another
on the weak. These indignities are the seedbed of anger, frustration, and swallowed bile
that nurture the hidden transcript’ of the subordinates.19 Anger, frustration, and bile do
appear in some of the R&B performers’ accounts of their experiences of recording for
independent labels in the 1950s and 60s. The narrative and hidden transcript perspectives
provide a useful framework for the study of royalty reform that takes the participants’
stories seriously while being sensitive to their possible ritualization, and that perceives
the broader symbolic and social stakes to be quite high, even where the dollar amounts
might not seem commensurate.
Nevertheless, despite the workings of narrative logic, the account does not lead to
an evaluation of the final outcome of the case as naturally or necessarily a positive one.
The royalty-reform driven formation of the Rhythm & Blues Foundation as a charitable
organization, responsible for distributing funds to needy musicians, does not represent a
‘fundamental’20 critique of or challenge to the sociopolitical order that produces poverty
for R&B performers as the flip-side of owners’ and executives’ wealth. Indeed, the
industry-governed structure of the Foundation appears to have hobbled it from the
beginning. Rock critic Dave Marsh—one of the Foundation’s founding board members—
asserted in 2002 that the organization’s ‘main mission appears to be covering up the
felonies committed against veteran soul / R&B artists’.21
Additionally, the essay does not endorse a normative approach according to which
intellectual property rights (contractual or statutory) should be a substitute for a
malfunctioning pension and social security system in the United States, or a categorically
legitimate means for the accumulation of wealth. Following Hesmondhalgh’s analysis of
digital sampling and cultural inequality,22 the essay perceives the pursuit and enforcement
19

Ibid. at 111.
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of public and private intellectual property rights as a practical tactic for fostering African
Americans’ cultural recognition, economic security, and social mobility.23 Such rights are
not, ultimately, as desirable as a non-white-supremacist, non-exploitative United States
would be. But even where such rights might in fact have undesirable corollaries,24 the
position is that companies’ failure to fulfill the original contractual obligations that
corresponded to performers’ royalty rights performers amounted at least to a missed
opportunity to narrow the social and economic gaps between black and white people in
the United States.25
3. Background – Indie Contracting & Accounting Regime
3.1 Common Practices
The postwar emergence of rhythm and blues music constituted a transformative
contribution to US popular music, ‘credited with and criticized for promoting integration
and economic opportunity for blacks while bringing to ‘mainstream’ culture black styles
and values’.26 The establishment in the late 1940s and early 1950s of hundreds of small
R&B-oriented record companies across the United States (colloquially known as the ‘rise
of the independents’) opened up opportunities for black musicians, songwriters,
arrangers, producers, and even some enterprisers, in addition to singers like Ruth Brown
and groups like the Clovers. These local and regional ‘indies’ could compete because the
major companies of the day had largely refused to produce for what was then called the
‘race market’, even in the face of ‘evidence of [that market’s] ample supply and
demand’,27 and because using inexpensive new audio tape technology and paying
songwriters and singers very little enabled them to ‘break even with sales of only 1,500
units’.28 Art Rupe, founder of Specialty Records, famously said, ‘I looked for an area
neglected by the majors and in essence took the crumbs off the table of the record
industry’.29 With few exceptions, the entrepreneurs who founded these companies were
experienced music industry veterans whose professional and entrepreneurial experiences
enabled them to perceive the market openings left by the major companies’ neglect of
black America. It was as insiders that these entrepreneurs institutionalized the contracting
and accounting practices that would be laid bare in the unfolding of the royalty reform
movement.
Documentary evidence of these companies’ practices—royalty statements,
contracts, memoranda, audits—is scarce, but a general picture emerges from scattered
23
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sources. The order of business generally went one of two ways: either the artist recorded
each ‘side’ (each song of a two-sided, two-song 78 or 45 rpm record) for a flat fee and
that was that, or the artist recorded for a flat fee and a (contractual) promise of royalties.
In the latter case, the custom was (and still is, although the numbers and complexity are
far greater today) that expenses associated with making the recording were understood to
be ‘advanced’ to the artist and were to be ‘recouped’ out of artist royalties. Standard
royalty rates for R&B performers were usually 1% - 2% of each sale of a record that cost
around 89 cents, with some reputedly artist-friendly companies like Atlantic offering as
much as 5%. In the contracts of the 1940s and 50s, the usual practice was to charge three
kinds of costs back to artist royalty accounts: payments made to the artist for the session,
payments made to side musicians for the session, and the costs of musical arrangements.
The funds advanced by the company to cover these costs functioned as loans that were to
be repaid out of artists’ anticipated royalties, before they could receive any payments
themselves (see Figure 1). According to this model, if the company spent $300 on side
musicians and an arrangement, and the artist was paid $50, then the company would
claim the first $350 of the artist’s royalty income (their 1%-5% of sales revenue) as
repayment.30

Fig. 1. Royalty advance and recoupment clause from the Drifters’ 1959 contract with Atlantic Records.

But the picture painted by the contract often bore little resemblance to the
subsequent artist-company relation, which was typically defined by the former’s
escalating rather than diminishing debts to the latter. In theory, the artist would receive
biannual accounting statements as long as the records were selling, and once those
advances were recouped out of artist royalties the artist’s royalty account would swell,
and he or she would and royalty checks along with the statements. Yet this is rarely how
things turned out. The royalty reformers’ research suggests very strongly that few R&B
performers ever recouped.31 Because of the way that advances and recording costs were
accounted, artists were typically already in debt from the moment they concluded their
very first recording session. Those debts persisted and often even grew, such that many
black artists parted from their labels with debts—known as ‘negative royalty account
30

This 1%-5% royalty rate was actually paid on 90% of sales; 10% was routinely deducted from sales
figures to account for “breakage”—the records of the time were very fragile. However, that 10% deduction
for breakage persisted as boilerplate long after fragile shellac records were replaced by much tougher vinyl
records.
31

The careers of Ray Charles (on Atlantic and then Paramount Records) and Chuck Berry (on Chess
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Charles and D Ritz, Brother Ray: Ray Charles’ Own Story (Dial, New York NY 1978) and B Pegg, Brown
Eyed Handsome Man: The Life and Hard Times of Chuck Berry (Routledge, New York 2002). With
respect to the role of race as variable, planned research will seek to specify if, how, and to what degree the
practices of the record companies producing niche music (e.g. hillbilly) for white audiences differed from
those R&B companies.

7

balances’—in the thousands or tens of thousands of dollars. Muddy Waters’ 1986 royalty
account balance was nearly $60,000 in the red even though he had earned nearly $25,000
in royalties in that year alone (he received no royalty payments because earnings had
been swallowed by this negative balance).32 Carla Thomas’ negative balance was
$80,000.33 How can such levels of debt be explained? Some is attributable to periodic
cash advances requested by the artists themselves, in addition to their recording fees—
their live performance incomes were uneven and companies would often dispense small
sums to keep an artist happy. According to Jerry Wexler of Atlantic Records, that ‘money
went on the record. It was a charge against royalties’.34 But, as I will explain in Section
V, additional direct payments to artists like these appear to account for only a small part
of these debts.
3.2 A Private, Exploitative, and Racialized IP System
At issue in royalty reform were record royalties (as opposed to composition
royalties), the most important form of recording-related compensation available to
performers who do not (or only rarely) write or co-write the songs they perform. Royalty
reform underscored the importance of record royalties for singers getting too old to tour
extensively, for whom union pensions and social security income could barely keep body
and soul together.
Another important factor in the situations of these artists has to do with the
copyright status of their recorded performances. Ruth Brown, the Clovers, Joe Turner and
the rest of the anticipated beneficiaries of royalty reform did the bulk of their most
significant and commercially successful recording in the 1950s and 60s. Yet sound
recordings were not protected by copyright until 1972, and the intended beneficiaries of
that protection were not performers but companies seeking a more powerful weapon
against the counterfeiting of records.35 Until that copyright revision, master recordings
(the audio tapes holding the music that would be pressed into records) were controlled by
being literally locked away in record company premises (thus the importance of ‘masters’
and ‘vaults’ in recording industry discourse). This absence of copyright protection had
implications for the status of the performers of sound recordings: roughly speaking,
without copyright protection there is no legal author. Thus, unlike composers—and
unlike the creators of post-1972 sound recordings—neither the performers featured on
32
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pre-1972 sound recordings nor their heirs have extra-contractual, statutory intellectual
property claims on their recordings. Pre-1972 record royalties, then, are individuallybargained private intellectual property rights,36 grounded in the contracts that created
them, whose exercise or enforcement was impracticable for most artists prior to the
royalty reform movement’s collective action.
The subsystem of exploitation that royalty reform set out to transform was an
intellectual property (IP) regime in which independent record companies recorded,
packaged, and sold thousands of R&B performances in the 1940s, 50s, and 60s, and then
repackaged and resold those recordings. This system produced income for the owners of
those recordings—not only the original companies but also the conglomerates who later
came to own those companies and/or their catalogues. This was a private IP regime
because pre-1972 sound recordings were not covered by federal copyright; royalties were
assigned by contract, not by statute. What made it exploitive (in the pejorative as well as
the technical sense) is that most of the performers of these recordings received no royalty
income from these sales, despite having recorded under contracts specifying companies’
obligation to make royalty payments as long as those records were selling, and despite
the original recording costs having long ago been recouped by the companies. It was a
racialized regime (at least in part) because almost all of the entrepreneurs who
established it were white (or, at least, not black, and enjoying meaningful degrees of
white advantage), and they built their companies almost entirely by selling black music to
black people (and later to larger mixed audiences), taking advantage of the major
companies’ general refusal to cater to black consumers and ‘continuing a pattern of
exploitation of blacks that spanned the century after “emancipation”’.37 Royalty reform
aimed to expose and destabilize this regime, and to secure royalty revenue for performers
and aid in their late-career recognition (as ‘pioneers’, as the Rhythm & Blues Foundation
award program would later characterize them).
Significantly, if only in a piecemeal fashion, royalty reform had the potential to
chip away at enduring structures of racial stratification in the US. Over the last several
centuries, racially differentiated pathways for the accumulation of wealth have produced
a United States in which the average black family holds less than one tenth the wealth of
the average white family.38 Moreover, an abiding, tacit, even unconscious agreement
among many (if not most) white people that ‘the moral and juridical rules normally
regulating the behavior of whites in their dealings with one another either do not apply at
all in dealings with nonwhites or apply only in a qualified form’39 has defined race
relations throughout US history. Putting aside (for now) concerns with specific evidence
of racist treatment, and simply keeping in mind that R&B contracting and royalty
practices developed in a social context in which ‘white supremacy was a generally
36

C Fisk, ‘The Role of Private Intellectual Property Rights in Markets for Labor and Ideas: Screen Credit
and the Writers Guild of America, 1938-2000’ (2011) 32 Berkeley Journal of Employment & Labor Law,
215.
37
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assumed and accepted state of affairs’,40 a counterfactual presents itself: The timely
payment of royalties would have made a proportionately greater improvement in the
fortunes of black performers and their families than it might have for white performers
and their families, and would have aided in reducing the ‘large racial wealth gap’41 by
enabling the cultivation of record-royalty-based annuities and income-generating
heritable rights.
4. Royalty Reform, 1985-1995
4.1 Ruth Brown and Howell Begle’s Dual Approach
In the 1960s and 70s, a series of lawyers had contacted Atlantic on Ruth Brown’s
behalf, only to be rebuffed by Atlantic’s repeated assertion that the singer was actually in
debt to the company to the tune of more than $25,000. But Brown’s pursuit of unpaid
royalties changed direction when, in 1983, she was introduced by a mutual friend to
Howell Begle, a corporate mergers-and-acquisitions attorney who had long been a fan of
Brown’s. Begle’s passion for R&B—and especially for Ruth Brown’s music—prompted
him to take the singer on as a client, and directly he began pressuring Atlantic Records
for access to their paperwork and explanations for Brown’s debt. As he met other
Atlantic performers Joe Turner and the Clovers through Brown, and recovered royalties
for them (their accounts were simpler to address than Brown’s), he and Brown became
determined to seek a collective solution to what was beginning to seem like a systemic
problem. However, they soon determined not to pursue a lawsuit, but they did not reveal
this decision to Atlantic or the press. Pursuing a lawsuit, they believed, would have the
disadvantage of enabling deep-pocketed Atlantic to drain the reformers’ resources by
interminably drawing out the discovery process.42 Moreover, as Begle later told the
Washington Post, the growing list of Atlantic artists he was representing ‘had claims for
very substantial sums of money’ but because these artists were in such ‘tough financial
straits’, he was concerned that the company could derail a lawsuit by making settlement
offers to them of pennies on the dollar.43 According to Begle, a broader collective effort
‘was a matter of principle with Ruth’, and she was ‘rock solid’ in her determination to
effect systemic change.44
Publicly narrating the problem as a systemic one, Brown and Begle developed a
dual approach to the problem of Atlantic’s unpaid royalties, cultivating positive public
perceptions of the value and significance of the artists and their bodies of work, and of
their treatment by the companies that had benefited from their exploitation, and doing the
40
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research to back up a formal petition to the company. Ruth Brown took every opportunity
to speak out about her experiences and those of her colleagues, repeatedly stressing the
importance of their contributions to US popular music. She also redoubled her effort to
rebuild her show business career after years of close-to-the-bone single parenthood
(detailed in her 1996 autobiography Miss Rhythm, which I quote in the following pages).
‘While Howell was chipping away at Atlantic’, she wrote, ‘I found work back in New
York wherever I could … hosting a radio program for National Public Radio, Harlem Hit
Parade, [accepting] whatever gigs came my way…anything to keep my profile high’
(Brown 1996: 206). Her job, as Begle later told me, was to make people care about her
situation and those of her R&B contemporaries. Howell Begle had significant material
and social resources at his command that Brown’s previous lawyers lacked. His regular
professional practice involved negotiating contracts for network television programs
(including the telecast of Ronald Reagan’s 1985 inaugural gala) and multi-million dollar
newspaper mergers.45 This placed him near the top of the US media food chain, with
(sometimes happenstance) access to powerful figures in influential adjacent fields,
including other media sectors, labor organizations, and the government.
4.2 Atlantic’s Hidden Transcript and the RICO Prospect
The first significant crack in the system opened in early 1984, when Begle was
visiting the Atlantic office looking for evidence of accounting that would explain Ruth
Brown’s negative royalty balance. In his words, he was ‘screaming at them all the time,
“Don’t you have royalty statements? Don’t you have copies of anything?”’46 An Atlantic
employee finally directed him to a box of old documents containing, among other things,
a run of accounting statements covering both royalty income and charges against
Brown’s royalty account for from 1955 until her 1961 dismissal, royalty statements for
one record (1957’s ‘Lucky Lips’), and a handful of revealing internal memoranda.
The details in these documents are fascinating; space considerations allow me
only to summarize Begle’s findings: First, Atlantic’s accounting for the years 1955-60
indicated that Brown’s total cash receipts from the label (the $4,000-$5,000 per year the
company said they paid her in session fees and other payments) were double what the
label claimed were her actual earnings of only around $2,000/year. Those $2,000-$3,000
overpayments, they argued, accounted for the negative royalty balance of $25,000 that
her account showed when she left the company in 1963. Next, the ‘Lucky Lips’ royalty
statements showed approximately 200,000 records sold (mostly in 1957), resulting in
royalty earnings of around $10,000 (none of which she would actually have received as it
would have been posted against and swallowed up by her outstanding debt). Yet this
record was one of three Ruth Brown records that Atlantic reported to the trade press as
million-sellers, on which she should (by that count) have earned much more. (‘They’re
either lying to the trades and the public, or they’re lying to the artists’, Begle told Legal
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Times47). Finally, the memoranda in this box included one that read ‘We did not pick up
royalties earned from 4/1/60 to 9/30/71’.48 In his summary memo, in Begle’s words, the
company was admitting
that when all these artists finished their careers in the 1960s and they all had these
large debit balances, the company decided there was no way in hell these people
were ever going to work their way out so let’s don’t even bother to go through the
exercise of even posting what they earned. All of Atlantic’s [subsequent] royalty
statements were fraudulent because they knew they were missing eleven years’
worth of data in those that had debit balances.49
In other words, ‘offstage’, Atlantic assumed early on that their R&B artists would never
recoup, and so stopped posting royalty earnings to their accounts, treating those earnings
as undifferentiated company income for eleven years.
This final ‘smoking gun’ memorandum gave Brown and Begle critical insights
into, and evidence of, Atlantic Records’ hidden transcript. ‘[D]ominant groups’, Scott
writes, ‘often have much to conceal, and typically they also have the wherewithal to
conceal what they wish’.50 This material had been concealed from Brown, and the
attorneys she’d retained over the years, for two decades. Had this employee known that
dusty box contained damning evidence of Atlantic’s hidden transcript, he or she might
have been more circumspect in the face of Begle’s demands, and its concealment might
have remained undisturbed.
This hidden transcript showed that Atlantic was engaging in ‘mail fraud’—
knowingly using the United States mail to send out fraudulent royalty statements.
Evidence of this practice made Atlantic susceptible to a suit under the banner of the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act of 1970, which provides
federal criminal penalties for those who ‘use proceeds derived from a “pattern of
racketeering activity” to operate…an enterprise’; this pattern is found in the ‘commission
of at least two “predicate acts” [such as murder, extortion, mail fraud] within ten years of
each other’.51 This law was passed in order to criminalize and make vulnerable to civil
charges the leaders and not just the hirelings of organizations that depend on or
participate in criminal activities, like motorcycle gangs or Mafia crime families. More to
the point, the RICO law is not constrained by the statutes of limitations that would have
barred a standard civil lawsuit over unpaid royalties from previous decades, and it
enables plaintiffs to compel the unsuccessful defendant not only to pay the plaintiff’s
legal fees but also to pay triple damages. Thus, the invocation of RICO put executives on
notice that they could be held perilously accountable for misdeeds carried out by their
47
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subordinates, so long ago that the regular law would not have applied. In Begle’s words,
‘Every statement they had sent out after [the date of the memo] was just another nail in
their coffin under RICO’—evidence of the commission of another ‘predicate act’.52 I’ve
suggested that lawsuits are a standard tool of negotiation in the US recording industry;
more often than not they culminate in out-of-court settlements and contract renegotiations
rather than awards of damages or injunctions. The credible threat of criminal prosecution
and civil liability under RICO is well outside that field’s realm of legitimate bargaining
tactics. In Ruth Brown’s words, ‘these memos were manna from heaven’,53 constituting a
crucial part of the foundation for the royalty reform successes that were to follow.
Moreover, as Begle and others observed at the time, RICO’s attorney fees and enhanced
damages provisions meant that establishing RICO as a viable new tactic in royalty
recovery would attract attorneys and encourage them to take on clients they otherwise
might pass over.54
As Begle’s research was progressing behind the scenes, a number of public
opinion-related developments were unfolding as a result of, and adding to, the increasing
circulation and credibility of royalty reform’s counterstory. In September of 1985, thanks
in part to Begle’s media connections, the CBS television network devoted a ten-minute
segment of its newsmagazine West 57th to the problem posed by unpaid royalties to
performers Bo Diddley, Brooke Benton, and Hank Ballard, in addition to highlighting
Begle and Brown’s efforts.55 In November of that year, Atlantic released the 14-volume
retrospective collection Atlantic Rhythm and Blues 1947-1974.56 ‘Ironically’, wrote the
Washington Post’s Richard Harrington, the collection ‘served as a checklist of potential
[royalty] plaintiffs’.57 Singer Joe Turner died that same month; he had been a major
Atlantic star whose dire situation the television program had discussed. In March of
1986, because he was now representing numerous veteran Atlantic R&B performers,
Begle received the first royalty statements reporting earnings on the Rhythm and Blues
collection. These statements brought into sharp relief the company’s persistent habit of
charging expenses to artists’ royalty accounts that were not allowed under their contracts.
As a Harrington put it,
Atlantic’s corporate bookkeepers tried to bill both [Ruth] Brown and [Joe]
Turner—who was undergoing dialysis treatments at the time and depending on
benefit concerts to pay his medical expenses—for the mastering, editing, and
mixing done for that collection though they hadn’t recorded for the label in 25
years. Begle protested, and when [Ahmet] Ertegun heard about it, he immediately
52
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put an end to such practices; when Turner died soon afterward, Ertegun paid for
his funeral and paid off the mortgage on his widow’s home.58
Ahmet Ertegun, founder of Atlantic Records, had remained in a position of paternalistic
authority even after he and producer/partner Jerry Wexler had sold the company to
Warner Communications Inc. (WCI) for $17 million in 1967. He was understood by
many observers to bear some direct responsibility for the company’s practices, and his
concern with the company’s reputation (and his own) made him more vulnerable than
other record company executives to credible charges of artist maltreatment.
4.3 Brown and Begle Recruit Advocates and Challenge the Dominant Perspective
Brown and Begle’s efforts began to synchronize and synergize with related
contests pressed by ongoing Civil Rights activism and unfolding in the federal
government. In April of 1986, Begle met Congressman Mickey Leland, a Democrat from
Texas and chair of the Congressional Black Caucus (a group of black members of
Congress established in 1971 around shared commitments to continuing the black Civil
Rights movement from within the US federal government), at a Women’s Political
Campaign Fund dinner. Ruth Brown writes that Leland was a ‘diehard music fan,
particularly [of] our brand’.59 Leland told Begle and Brown that noted Civil Rights
activist and 1984 presidential candidate Jesse Jackson was preparing to attack WCI for
‘their almost complete lack of African-Americans in senior positions at the company, as
well as their continuing trade with South Africa’.60 Jackson, Begle, and Leland would
soon yoke together their related struggles to press WCI executives on their minority
hiring and royalty accounting practices. Around the same time, Begle was introduced to
Congressman John Conyers, a Democrat from Michigan, by Bill Harris of the Clovers,
who was Conyers’ bass guitar instructor. Informing Conyers about his work with Brown
and her colleagues, Begle urged the progressive congressman to oppose a pending
attempt by congressional conservatives to gut the RICO law, which he presented as the
only available legal remedy for Ruth Brown and her fellow Atlantic artists. That July,
Conyers held a hearing on RICO reform at which Ruth Brown testified movingly about
Atlantic’s refusal to consider her pleas and about the many other artists who had tried and
failed or who were still trying to recover royalties.61 Her testimony in this very public and
political venue, and its coverage in a major story by the Orlando Sentinel’s Washington
correspondent Anne Groer,62 widened the crack in Atlantic’s institutional and symbolic
position that had been opened by the documentary revelations of the previous year.
Had Ruth Brown been seeking redress from almost any other of the 1950s R&B
independents it is likely that things would have turned out very differently. Atlantic was
uniquely susceptible to pressure from a well-placed attorney and a singer whose
comeback was flowering. The company’s success in transitioning from R&B to rock
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music (signing what turned out to be mega-acts like Led Zeppelin, Genesis, and Crosby,
Stills & Nash) had been overseen by Ahmet Ertegun, who remained the company’s head.
On the one hand, this continuity meant that even though the company had lost a good
deal of paperwork over the years, the business records it did manage to preserve
amounted to much more than was available to artists signed to companies that had not
remained intact for nearly 40 years. On the other hand, Ertegun’s interest in his and his
company’s legacy supported his strong concern with the appearance of legitimacy.
Indeed, in addition to Atlantic’s ambitious program of reissues of its classic R&B
recordings, the 1980s saw Ertegun participating actively in the foundation of the Rock
and Roll Hall of Fame63 and the production of a 12-hour concert at Madison Square
Garden commemorating Atlantic’s 40th anniversary, headlined by an eagerly-anticipated
Led Zeppelin reunion performance. These high-profile heritage projects framed Ertegun
as a cultured philanthropist and Atlantic as a venerable cultural institution. Begle and
Brown’s unrelenting exposure not only of Atlantic Records’ racialized political
economy—how ‘for years Atlantic benefited from the lower royalties it paid’ to the black
artists whose music and its sales put the company on the map64—but also of evidence of
habitual royalty fraud proposed a narrative about the company that contradicted and
threatened to undermine the official story that Ertegun was at pains to promulgate as he
approached his eighth decade.
4.4 The Reform Effort’s First Major Settlement and the Rhythm and Blues Foundation
By early 1987, Begle was convinced that Ruth Brown’s negative royalty balance
was not the result of additional cash payments made by the company to the artist. With
the help of gathering public opprobrium, Begle pushed the company to perform a ‘test
audit’ on the accounts of eight Atlantic artists, requesting accounting for specific types of
ongoing unauthorized charges about which he had confidentially been informed by a
former Atlantic accountant. One of these was a ‘packaging’ charge typically included in
contracts signed in the 1970s and later, but absent from the 1950s contracts; the audit
turned up unauthorized packaging charges against each of the eight artist accounts
ranging from $1400 to $106,500.65 The audit revealed that the eight artists were
overcharged a total of $250,000 with respect to the type of charges Begle specified in his
audit request; given the size of these artists’ negative royalty balances, it was virtually
certain that the test audit indicated only a fraction of the total unauthorized charges. Later
in 1987, when the company finally produced sales figures for Brown’s records covering
the years since her 1963 departure, Atlantic’s
accounting for the worldwide sale of [Brown’s] recordings was so slipshod that
[her $26,000] negative balance was only shrunk by $6,000. (It was still $19,000 in
February 1987.) This means that [her] royalty earnings, as calculated by Atlantic,
for the entire 24 year period, averaged less than $300 per year.66
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Music journalist Dave Marsh pointed out on the television news magazine Nightline in
1995 that these figures defied belief; ‘it wouldn’t have been cost-effective’ for Atlantic—
’the General Sherman of its own back catalogue’—to keep records in print that sold in
such small quantities.67 Between the test audit’s results and Atlantic’s statement of
Brown’s 1963-1987 royalties, the company’s position was steadily undermined.
Also in the spring of 1987, Begle, Congressman Leland, and Jesse Jackson had
begun a series of meetings with WCI executives, with Ertegun finally participating in the
fall of that year. Over the course of this series of meetings Congressman Leland proposed
the creation of a foundation to oversee the reparations that Atlantic would inevitably have
to make to its aging performers and/or their estates. As Ruth Brown wrote, the idea
resonated with Warner Communications’ head Steve Ross because it had two great
advantages:
First, it would ensure that money found its way directly into artists’ pockets. The
problem with a straightforward back-payment of royalties was the slice liable to
be hijacked by ex-managers and agents emerging from the woodwork at the smell
of new money. There was nothing in [Leland’s suggested system of foundation
grants], for example, for a Chuck Rubin. Sorry, Chuck! Second—Mickey
Leland’s point in the first place—was that there did not seem to be any realistic
way to expect that whatever money paid out in royalty recalculations would
approach the sum actually due. Money dispensed through a ‘Rhythm and Blues’
foundation would at least begin to make up for the lost years. And the grants
could be tax-free. Yep, it was a brilliant notion.68
Atlantic committed $1.5 million to fund the Foundation, and a further $500,000 toward
future operating costs. Ahmet Ertegun reserved to himself the right to decide which ‘30
or so artists [were] to be included in royalty recalculation efforts’ that Atlantic would
undertake specifically to address the claims of Begle’s Atlantic clients.69 Just before the
1988 Atlantic 40th anniversary concert, Atlantic, Begle, and his clients worked out a
compromise. In exchange for wiping out negative royalty balances and setting up the
Foundation, the company would be responsible only for paying back royalties to cover
the period 1970 to 1988 (rather than including the 1950s and 60s, for which they said
they had no paperwork), and integrating those artists’ masters into their computerized
royalty tracking system to ensure regular, accurate accounting and payments.70
Predictably, representatives of WCI maintained that ‘the company [was] responding to
artistic merit and financial need, not to the threat of lawsuits’.71 Bob Morgado, senior
vice president at WCI, told the Washington Post that ‘[t]here is no obligation on the part
of companies to entertain audit challenges that are 20 or 30 years old’, although he did
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concede that Atlantic ‘was founded on black music’ and that ‘[m]any of the artists who
had a lot to do with the development of modern pop music, and with the creation of the
business for us, never really participated in the economic fortunes of that business’.72
Over the next several years, Ruth Brown’s comeback—including her appearance
as Motormouth Maybelle in John Waters’ 1988 film Hairspray, a Tony-winning
performance in the 1989 Broadway musical Black and Blue, a 1989 Grammy award, and
the beginning of a long-lived association with Bonnie Raitt—enabled her to continue
telling her story and to advocate for royalty reform’s extension beyond Atlantic to other
major labels profiting from the ongoing resurgence of interest in R&B. The R&B
Foundation and its board members and supporters (including Raitt, Blues Brother Dan
Ackroyd, music writer Dave Marsh, Mickey Leland, songwriter Doc Pomus, and activist
Joyce McRae), aided by sympathetic reporters like Groer, David Hinckley of the New
York Daily News, and Richard Harrington of the Washington Post, exhorted other major
companies to join Atlantic in royalty reform. A significant boost came in January of
1989, when the controversial head of the Republican National Party, Lee Atwater,
contrived an inaugural ‘Concert for Young Americans’ in honor of George Bush the
elder, featuring many of the R&B artists involved in and benefiting from royalty
reform.73 Later that year, MCA not only wiped out negative royalty balances for the
artists who had recorded decades before on companies that MCA had purchased, it also
wrote new contracts paying royalties at 10%, bringing affected artists ‘into the
mainstream of royalty payments’.74 A few years later, Denon/the Nippon Columbia Co.,
and Rhino Records followed suit, eliminating out negative balances and raising royalty
rates to 10% for artists whose original contracts were with R&B independents now
owned by those companies. Capitol/EMI went even further, initiating the same reforms
‘for all pre-1972 artists, regardless of musical genre’.75 That latter company’s CEO Jim
Fifield remarked that embracing royalty reform ‘wasn’t a financial consideration. It was
what I felt was the right thing to do for artists whose contracts were signed, say, in the
‘50s or ‘60s, but whose music was being purchased in the 1990s’.76 This sentiment
contradicts the contractarian line otherwise so ruthlessly maintained by record
executives.77
Yet the Rhythm & Blues Foundation—the flagship of royalty reform’s gains—
was not without controversy and its legacy is a contested one. Despite the participation of
the above-named artists and advocates, the influence of industry honchos and money
complicated the Foundation’s efforts to distribute its funds to needy performers. In late
October of 1991, Warner Communications Inc. ‘restructured’ its 1988 promise of
$150,000 per year for operating expenses, instead splitting the next year’s $150,000 into
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three annual payments of $50,000. According to the Washington Post, ‘the move
provoked the immediate resignation of board member Dave Marsh, who dubbed WCI's
restructuring a ‘reneging’. He said the company’s commitment had been unconditional
and WCI “had no right to unilaterally impose new conditions”’.78 ‘Gerald Bursey, who
oversaw the foundation's health insurance task force, resigned in February [1994] after
unsuccessfully urging the organization to do more to help artists recoup unpaid royalties
from record labels’.79 And in 1995, Begle himself resigned in frustration over the
Foundation’s increasing operating budget and glitzy award ceremonies, and its reluctance
to distribute what it now considered its principal—the $1,000,000 or so that remained
from WCI’s initial ‘gift’.80 As board member Bonnie Raitt told Rolling Stone that year,
‘The R&B Foundation isn’t about a dinner party once a year where you get to hear some
legendary people perform. The people who built this industry are suffering, and it’s not
OK to wait until they’re gone’.81
5. Conclusion
The US recording industry of the 1980s had integrated the 1950s R&B
independents’ recordings, contracts, accounting practices, and orientation toward
performers into their operations. Performers’ persisting indebtedness to record
companies, decades after they stopped recording, despite the continuing profitable
circulation of their records, was widespread. While the dominant perspective suggests
that this problem was the result of performers’ profligacy,82 the analysis here has argued
that this phenomenon resulted at least in part from the inability of performers to influence
the terms on which they did their work, and the terms on which company’s contractual
obligations would be met. Royalty reform recast the R&B artist-company relationship as
one of domination, and took aim at it, bringing ethical, legal and political pressure to bear
at a moment when the legitimacy of one of the major institutions in the field—Atlantic
Records—was of paramount concern and hence open to inflection and challenge.
It was not foreordained that Ruth Brown, Joe Turner, the Clovers, and their
colleagues would benefit materially or symbolically from the continuing circulation of
their music. Drawing on critical race theory’s understanding of narrative and Scott’s
conception of the hidden transcripts of power relations, this essay has argued that a
fortuitous constellating of a number of facts made Ruth Brown and Howell Begle’s
consequential intervention possible. Atlantic’s continuity of leadership, its inadvertent
disclosure of its own hidden transcript, and its founder’s emphasis on prestige made that
company, and the dominant perspective that had legitimized it, especially vulnerable to
challenge. Ruth Brown’s determination to correct the systemic denial of royalties to the
group of veterans to which she belonged, rather than focusing on her own fortune, her
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even-keeled public persona, and her penetrating and concise narrative and observations
made her contributions especially credible. Begle’s commanding position in an adjacent
media sector, his acquaintance with influential political figures, and the support of his
employer for thousands of hours of pro bono work over more than a decade gave
extraordinary weight to his efforts. In the absence of any of these factors it is likely that
Brown would have, at best, received some pennies-on-the-dollar settlement, of which a
more run-of-the-mill royalty recovery expert would have taken as much as 50% in
perpetuity.83
The work of the royalty reformers zeroed in on the ethics and mechanics of
companies’ royalty accounting practices, constructing a vivid image of a private,
exploitive, and racialized IP regime, whose already-low royalty rates were exacerbated
by evident fraud. Intellectual property rights (including contractual rights to record
royalties) are potentially significant forms and/or sources of wealth, as (for example)
struggles among Michael Jackson’s and Jimi Hendrix’s heirs show.84 This axiom, as
Greene has argued,85 is especially crucial for black people in the United States, who have
been systematically disadvantaged: by white supremacist state housing and labor policies,
formal and informal exclusion from various markets, and by sedimented and
institutionalized racism.86 One of Martin Luther King’s heirs has opined that ‘copyright
and intellectual property are the real estate of the future’,87 suggesting that the creation,
management, and marketing of valuable IP is an increasingly important means of
accumulation. From this perspective, black people in the United States may be able to
cultivate income-generating forms of heritable wealth, improving their life chances and
social mobility and narrowing the ‘large racial wealth gap’88 produced by centuries and
generations of white supremacist state and civil society institutions. This is not to say that
copyright and intellectual property are the best way or even a desirable way to achieve
economic stability and social mobility. The desirability of a non-white supremacist
United States with substantial social security systems and regimes of worker rights
should be self-evident. Rather, the perspective is that royalty reform shows how the
contracting and accounting systems of the US record industry impeded blacks’ progress
toward parity with whites, or at least did not support black economic progress to a degree
commensurate with material or symbolic value of their contributions. The thrust of
royalty reform’s main arguments was that economic justice with respect to IP rights can
83
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make meaningful (if still sub-optimal) changes to the lives of black performers and, as
Greene89 observes, can provide a forum for the consideration of further measures.
As a first issue of a larger ongoing research project, this paper has sought to lay
out some of the salient aspects of this racialized political economy’s subsystem of R&B
exploitation. Many questions remain the answers to which will help explain and specify
the royalty reform movement’s 1984-2004 career. First, this paper has not said much
about the conceptual frameworks, subjectivities, and narratives of the R&B performers
themselves. Scott argues that ‘the hidden transcript is specific to a given social site and to
a particular set of actors’, and that ‘[e]ach hidden transcript…is actually elaborated
among a restricted ‘public’ that excludes—that is hidden from—certain specified
others’.90 How did these performers—as members of a restricted public—understand and
narrate their experiences of appropriation, subordination, indignity when they were
‘offstage’? Future work along these lines will also focus more fully on the relationship
between principles of ‘recognition’ (questions of meaning, membership, and identity yet
to be addressed systematically in the research) and ‘redistribution’ (the more material,
political-economic questions of the kind explored in this paper) highlighted by Nancy
Fraser,91 with an eye to the racial hierarchies potentially at work in companies owned by
first- or second-generation members of white(ning) immigrant groups. This theme will
benefit from further engagement with analyses of the property of whiteness92 and racial
disparities in wealth accumulation and social mobility as well as the deep-seated white
supremacy that undergirds social relations in the United States.93
Second, one major question is to find out what kind of impact royalty reform
actually had on the socioeconomic trajectories of the R&B performers and their families.
Have their heirs been afforded meaningful economic stability and social mobility as a
result of royalty back-payments and new royalty rates? This question would be profitably
addressed through interviews with surviving spouses and sons and daughters, in addition
to other kinds of legal, primary and secondary source research. Third, political-theoretical
questions of rights also merit further consideration. As individually bargained private IP
rights not backstopped by federal copyright legislation, pre-1972 rights to record royalties
are comparatively ephemeral, and their enforcement is constrained by parties’ disparities
in social power. Moreover, where subordinated groups seek rights to redress injuries, as
Wendy Brown94 shows, outcomes often involve further injury; to what sorts of perverse
outcomes might royalty reform have led? Finally (for now), questions of aging,
retirement, and disability in popular music have remained in the background here; these
too are worth extended consideration. Future research will aim to address these questions
while focusing in more detail on further episodes in the 1984-2004 royalty reform saga,
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including the formation and transformation of the Rhythm & Blues Foundation, Sam
Moore and Curtis Mayfield’s class action suit against the AFTRA Pension and Welfare
Funds, Peggy Lee’s class action suit against Decca Records and its owner, MCA
Records, and California State Senator Kevin Murray’s pursuit of an amendment to the
state’s civil code regarding royalty auditing. This first phase of royalty reform resulted in
an unlikely milestone: record company executives acknowledged widespread and
systematic exploitation and committed money and organizational resources to redressing
those past wrongs. Later phases carried the struggle to new fronts: class-action lawsuits
and legislative innovation.
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